South African source kept confidential: Bosasa Operation Pty Ltd v Basson & Anor [2012] ZAGPJHC 71

Joburg High Court

In this age of the Leveson Inquiry and Rupert Murdoch being cross-examined as to why there may be dozens of people arrested in his newspaper empire for crimes like phone hacking the telephone lines of people who lost family members in Iraq, it is good to see that once in a while, the basic idealistic virtues of journalists can still thrive.

The location last week was the Johannesburg High Court. The issue was the confidentiality of a journalists’ source. The result was an emphatic win for the media.

What happened was this: from 22 May 2009, Adrian Basson, a journalist, wrote a number of articles for the Mail & Guardian in South Africa, exposing a corrupt relationship between the plaintiff, a company, and the Department of Correctional Services.

On 20 July 2009, the plaintiff issued proceedings against the newspaper and the journalist, who asserted a number of defences:

  • That the corrupt relationship was so well-known inSouth Africathat the plaintiff’s reputation was not injured. In that respect, from 9 July 2008 to 29 January 2010, 33 articles had been written about it, with 18 of those in different newspapers;
  • That suing the defendants was arbitrary, not bona fide and an abuse of process. Apparently M&G was small and lacked resources;
  • The articles were true or alternatively fair comment on matters of public interest;
  • The articles were covered by qualified privilege, being a fair and accurate report of a special report that was placed before parliament.

After pleadings closed, the plaintiff sought discovery of the names of the

Adriaan Basson, journalist

defendants’ sources, which had been redacted. The plaintiff claimed that by redacting the names of the sources, the plaintiff’s rights to a fair trial were infringed. The defendants refused and asserted that to reveal their sources would infringe their right to freedom of the press, contained in section 16 of the Constitution and the journalist had given undertakings to the sources that their identities would not be revealed.

Section 16 of the Constitution states:

16. Freedom of expression

(1)   Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes

(a)   freedom of the press and other media;

(b)   freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;”…

Quoting from Lord Denning in British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 at 1129:

“If they [newspapers] were compelled to disclose their source, they would soon be bereft of information which they ought to have. Their sources would dry up. Wrongdoing would not be disclosed. Charlatans would not be exposed. Unfairness would go unremedied. Misdeeds in the corridors of power – in companies or government departments – would never be known.”

 The judge walked through a number of South African authorities speaking of the freedom of the press, the freedom of speech and the value of keeping sources confidential. Justice Tsoka then considered the status of journalists’ sources in other jurisdictions: England, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Holland, USA and even Australia.

The conclusion was essentially this, at [38]:

 “Having regard to the authorities cited above, it is apparent that journalists, subject to certain limitations, are not expected to reveal the identity of their sources. If indeed freedom of the press is fundamental and sine qua non for democracy, it is essential that in carrying out this public duty for the public good, the identity of their sources should not be revealed, particularly when the information so revealed, would not have been publicly known. This essential and critical role of the media, which is more pronounced in our nascent democracy, founded on openness, where corruption has become cancerous, needs to be fostered rather than denuded.”

 Tsoka J concluded that the identity of the sources was irrelevant to the defamation claim. The defendants were not entitled to know who they were. While the journalists were not entitled to a blanket privilege, in this case, the plaintiff was a company that tendered for a government contract and was expected to comply with the terms of the Constitution. Whether it won the tender fairly was a matter the public was entitled to know about.

Finally, the sources were acting in the public interest in revealing information and the plaintiff’s right to a fair trial was not infringed. The plaintiff’s application was dismissed with costs. A victory for the journalist, and a victory for free speech.



Black is Back in Ontario: Breeden v Black [2012] SCC 19

Conrad Black

The term “libel tourist” seems to be something bandied about by defamation defendants to suggest some sort of impropriety by a defamation plaintiff.  The point that publishers seem to make is this: where something is published all around the world, the defamation plaintiff should not be allowed to simply pick and choose the jurisdiction that is most favourable to him or her. By chosing the most favourable jurisdiction in which to sue, they are a “libel tourist”…. and that is bad.

This is especially relevant when the USA is involved. With their Bill of Rights, obsession with free speech and the open slather granted to write about anyone resembling a public figure (see Larry Flynt case), successful defamation verdicts in USA are enormously hard to come by. Which is where Conrad Black comes into the story.

He is the latest to have been labelled a “libel tourist”, and this was in Canada. His was one of two cases that recently came before the Canadian Supreme Court, with the same issue to be decided. Did the Ontario Superior Court have jurisdiction to hear defamation claims which had substantial links to other places?

The second case involved Banro Corporation, a mining company from Ontario,

Canadian Supreme Court Judges

about which a critical book had been written in Quebec. The book was also available in libraries in Ontario and so Banro sued in Ontario. Because similar issues were decided, I will put that decision to one side for now.

Back to Black.

Conrad Black is a well-known Canadian, famous around the world for having run newspapers in Canada and internationally. He was a Canadian citizen until 2001 when he abandoned that citizenship to accept an appointment to the British House of Lords.

Lord Black was the Chairman of Hollinger International Inc, a public company in New York. In May 2003, a minority shareholder questioned the legitimacy of certain `non-compete’ and `management service’ payments made by it to Lord Black, or his companies. A Special Committee was formed by Hollinger and in October 2003, the Committee produced a Report that concluded that Hollinger had made $32.15 million of unauthorized payments, of which Black personally received $7.2 million. The US Securities and Exchange Commission brought a complaint and the Report was produced to the Northern District Court of Illinois. It was also posted on Hollinger’s website. Hollinger issued press releases and made statements in its annual report.

Most notable was the defendants’ assertion that Black presided “over a corporate kleptocracy that was engaged in a systemic, wilful and deliberate looting” of Hollinger. They accused Black of “improperly enriching himself,” misleading the company’s board of directors and breaching his fiduciary duty to them. They also said, “Black created an entity in which ethical corruption was a defining characteristic of the leadership team.

In 2004 and 2005, Black sued for defamation. He brought proceedings in the Ontario Superior Court. Black was going to obtain a juridical advantage by suing in Ontario since there was a lack of an actual malice requirement on the publishers (as opposed to the USA). The defendants applied to stay the case, on the grounds that there was no real and substantial connection between the actions and Ontario, or alternatively that New York or Illinois was the more appropriate forum.

Of the 10 defendants, 1 lived in Ontario, the rest in USA, with 1 in Israel. Several other criminal and civil cases were commenced in USA and Canada. In 2007, Black was convicted of mail fraud and obstruction of justice. He was sentenced to 6 and a half years in jail. Since that time, Black had a number of convictions quashed and his sentence substantially reduced. He asserted that the criminal trials were a miscarriage of justice.

At the time of the appeal, Black was in jail in Florida and he was not going to be allowed to enter Canada without the special permission of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, even after getting out of jail.

Ontario flag

Most of the witnesses and evidence was located in USA. But Black was born and raised in Ontario. He established his reputation as a businessman in Ontario, is a member of the Order of Canada, the Canadian Business Hall of Fame and the Canadian Press Hall of Fame. Black’s family lives inOntario. So because there had been publication in Ontario, he could claim a cause of action arose in Ontario. Regardless, the defendants tried to stay the case.

On the original application, the trial judge concluded that the Ontario court did have jurisdiction to hear the claims and that the defendants had not established that Illinois was a clearly more appropriate forum. An appeal from that decision was dismissed and the defendants appealed further to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court concluded that both the courts of Illinois and Ontario were appropriate forums for the trial of the actions, and that Illinois did not emerge as a clearly more appropriate forum [29]. Black only brought a claim in respect of damage in Ontario. His claim was that because of his reputation, the most substantial harm was done in Ontario. Having said that, Black accepted that a judgment in Ontario could not be enforced in USA.

Black won because the court concluded that it would be unfair to prevent him from suing in the community where his reputation was established [36], and this weighed heavily. It also concluded that Illinois was not clearly more appropriate, so the case stays in Canada.

Shortly after, on 4 May Lord Black was actually released from prison  and, with the permission of the Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration he returned to Canada. His lawyers also told of Black’s other good news, which was revealed that his cases were settled on a confidential basis.

 

 

 



Banker’s sexual harassment and defamation claims demolished: Dye v Commsec [2012] FCA 242

The plaintiff: photo from The Australian

From March 2005 until November 2007, Vivienne Dye worked for Commsec. Her position was made redundant, and later, she made a claim to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission that she had been sexually harassed by two senior executives, Mr Michael Blomfield and Mr Angus Patterson.

In April 2008, her allegations were published in the media around Australia, where the two senior executives were named. Commsec replied that appropriate investigations had been carried out and that Ms Dye’s claims were found to be unfounded. Commsec also offered to assist the executives, if they wished to take steps to clear their names.

Blomfield took Commsec up on that offer and sued the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, who apologized. Other proceedings were also issued against News Ltd and The Daily Telegraph. News Ltd claimed that the allegations made by Ms Dye were true. That trial ran in September 2009, and after Ms Dye had been cross-examined at some length, News Ltd withdrew its truth defence. The case settled in Blomfield’s favour for an undisclosed sum. One would have thought that this might have discouraged Ms Dye from her own litigation, but she proceeded with an array of her own cases nonetheless.

Ms Dye had commenced proceedings in the Federal Court, asserting a range of causes of action, including sexual harassment. She also commenced defamation proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court, primarily in relation to publications made to the media by Commsec, after her own allegations had been made public in April 2008. Each of the proceedings were heard together in the Federal Court by His Honour Justice Robert Buchanan.

The trial started on 7 March 2011, and ended on 8 December 2011. Ninety-four days of hearing culminated in an extraordinary judgment from Justice Buchanan (744 paragraphs, 236 pages), who massacred Ms Dye’s credibility as a witness and concluded that her allegations were substantially false. She lost on all accounts. His Honour stated:

 ”Ms Dye’s written accounts of matters [have], over the years, been substantially altered, re-ordered, edited, polished, embellished and even substantially changed as though it were a novel.”

 His Honour rejected outright her assertions that the Commonwealth Bank executives had sexually harassed her and, in Patterson’s case, had sexually assaulted her. He found instead that Vivienne Dye had once viewed both as mentors and later developed her own reasons, based on falsehood, to accuse them of sexual harassment.

Justice Buchanan also concluded that Ms Dye’s inability to find future employment was the result of her own allegations made in April 2008: “which I am satisfied, was arranged on her behalf and with her knowledge, agreement and active participation.” [24].

Regarding the defamation claim, the judgment started at paragraph [684] and page 219. Ms Dye alleged that emails were sent to the newspapers with the following imputations about her:

  • She made false allegations that Mr Patterson had sexually harassed her to the Commonwealth Bank;
  • She made false allegations that Mr Blomfield had sexually harassed her to the Commonwealth Bank;
  • She conducted herself in such a manner as to warrant being sued by employees of the Commonwealth Bank;
  • She wrongly leaked information to the media that was the subject of a Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission investigation.

While His Honour accepted that the publications contained several of the imputations alleged, at the end of the day, it really came down to this at paragraph [702]:

 “The imputations alleged were, if carried, in fact true. There is no need here to repeat the factual findings already made. This defence is clearly established. It defeats the action in defamation.”

 Further, the publications were protected by common law privilege, including that they were in reply to an attack. A person who is attacked has both a right and an interest in repelling or refuting the attack. Ms Dye claimed malice and at [718]:

 “Ms Dye has fallen so far short of establishing malice, a matter about which she bears the onus, that it is scarcely necessary to discuss the question at all…..”

 And so, not only did Ms Dye lose her case for damages, she was ordered to pay Commsec’s costs of running a 94-day trial. Apparently, the costs order was around $5.85 million. Not a good day at the office.

 

 



Google liable for its misleading search results: ACCC v Google Inc [2012] FCAFC 49

In terms of defamation, there hasn’t been a case in Australia that considers whether Google Inc is a publisher of indexed search results from its search engine. In England, a single judge has concluded that Google is not a publisher of results from its search engine, nor is it a publisher of material on blogger.com. As yet, no Australian judge has had to consider it.

But now, a development. Sort of. On 3 April, the Full Federal Court had to consider whether Google Inc, in producing its search results on its famous search engine from Silicon Valley, had made misleading or deceptive representations for the purposes of the Australian Consumer Law.

 For those not averse with matters of Australian law, trade practices, or commercial disputes of any description, under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), a person cannot engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive in trade or commerce. In terms of commercial law, this has been the catch-all provision for all or any commercial dispute. No matter who, what or how much, when a commercial dispute arose, there would virtually always be an allegation that the other side was misleading or deceptive.

 The ACCC is in charge of monitoring all conduct in trade or commerce and can itself bring cases against parties that it believes are breaching that provision.

 Which brings us back to Google. In 2007 and 2008, when a person who wanted to travel to Mongolia used Google to search for “Harvey World Travel”, the search results revealed, among other matters, a sponsored link to a competitor, STA Travel. It said this:

 Harvey World Travel

www.statravel.com.au Unbeatable deals on flights, Hotels & Pkg’s Search, Book & Pack Now!”

 Misleading or deceptive conduct sure, but is Google liable for that?

 The ACCC brought cases along similar lines for this and 3 other types of businesses (Honda, Alpha Dog Training, Just 4x4s) and alleged that Google Inc were to blame.

 At first instance in September last year, Justice Nicholas concluded that Google had not made any representations because its search engine operated in a way whereby ordinary and reasonable users would have known that the sponsored links were advertisements and had nothing to do with Google. Google did not make the representations, as it did not endorse or adopt them. The reader would distinguish between organic search results and sponsored links. Google was no more than a conduit for the advertiser.

 The ACCC was not mucking around with this one though. It appealed to the Full Court, and the three judges: Keane CJ, Jacobson and Lander JJ upheld its appeal.

 The ACCC argued that Google took an active role in the preparation dissemination and publication of the ads, and accordingly made the relevant representations. It pointed to 3 matters [75]:

  • Google tightly controlled the results generated by a search and the way the results were presented;
  • Google’s AdWords program permits advertisers to target their advertisements;
  • Google’s internal processes serve to closely supervise the available keywords for an advertisement.

 The Court considered the evidence of Google, particularly how its search engine and its AdWords program worked. It was important that Google used its own complex algorithms to produce the search results and put them into order of relevance.

 The Judges then found that an ordinary reasonable user would conclude that it was Google who was displaying the sponsored link together with the sponsor’s website and so it was more than a mere conduit. Critically, the sponsored link is displayed in response to the user’s query, which is made by the entry of selected key words and at [90]: “the user asks a question of Google and obtains Google’s response…

 The response to the inquiry was the conduct of Google and it was misleading. Appeal allowed.

 What it means in terms of defamation is not insignificant. While the matter might be headed to the High Court, for now, using this case as a precedent (and trying to ignore everything from England), lawyers will try to argue that it means that Google is a publisher of search results on Google’s website. Then there is the further question of the use by Google of a hyperlink.

 So perhaps some encouragement for defamation plaintiffs around Australia, particularly if an author of defamatory material is anonymous. In any event, something to think about for Google.



Estate agent wins damages against Alice Spring News: Forrest v Chlanda & Anor [2012] NTSC 14

 

The plaintiff. Photo courtesy of www.framptons.com.au

The plaintiff was a real estate agent in Alice Springs, operating under the name First National Real Estate Framptons. He was also the Southern regional representative of the Real Estate Institute of the Northern Territory. The self-represented defendants were the publishers of the Alice Spring News. The first defendant being the director and journalist who wrote the article in question and appeared at the trial. On 2 September 2010, he wrote this:

 
Real Estate Institute silent on role of Framptons boss as probes by police & govt board continue. By Erwin Chlanda
 
The Real Estate Intitute of Northern Territory Inc (REINT) has failed to respond to three enquiries from the Alice Spring News about whether David Forrest has been stood aside as the organization’s southern region representative,
Mr Forrest is a principal of Framptons First National Real Estate which is the subject of a fraud investigation by the police and an enquiry by the NT Government’s Agents Licensing Board ,http://www.alice-springsnews.com.au/1720.html..
The probes follow the collapse of Carey Builders, causing losses estimated in the millions to several home buyers in Alice Springs.
Framptons had close links with the failed company, promoting its services and offering performance and completion guarantees, according to documents provided to the Alice Springs News by the home buyers.
…..
Framptons, after initially providing information, have told the Alice News they will not comment further on matters relating to Carey Builders and their responsibilities towards their clients.”
 

The plaintiff sued and claimed the following imputations arose from the article:

  • He has behaved in such a way as principal of First National Real Estate Framptons as to deserve to be stood aside as southern region representative of the Real Estate Institute of Northern Territory Inc;
  • He is suspected by police of having engaged in fraud as principal of First National Real Estate Framptons;
  • He has conducted the business of First National Real Estate Framptons in such a way as to allow it to be suspected by police of engaging in fraud.

 The defendants asserted defences of honest opinion, qualified privilege and contextual truth.

Justice Kelly found that the article carried the imputations and then in respect of the defences, found against the defendants on all counts. Their main problem was that Framptons simply were not, and had never been, the subject of a fraud investigation by the NT Police. Not a good start for the journalist. Also the Judge concluded the following:

  1. The defendants failed to prove that there were reasonable grounds to enquire into the possibility of fraud on the part of the First National Real Estate Framptons;
  2. The facts on which the opinions were based were not true. Namely, not only that Framptons were not the subject of a fraud investigation by the NT Police, but nor were they subject of an enquiry by the Agents’ Licensing Board;
  3. The qualified privilege defence could not succeed because the defendants had not acted reasonably. Chlanda had admitted in evidence that he simply assumed, without checking, that Framptons were under investigation by police for fraud and he took no steps to verify those suspicions with the police.

 In assessing damages, Kelly J found that the plaintiff was entitled to aggravated damages, by reason of the defendant’s conduct since the publication. That conduct was this:

  • The defendants refused to withdraw the publication from its website;

    The defendant

  • The defendants contended that it was sufficient that at a later time, they properly hyperlinked the article to another article where it was stated that Framptons were not under police investigation and never had been under police investigation (when the defendants found out that this was actually the case).  
  • Nevertheless, the defendants wrote on their website that there would be: “further evidence of a fraud investigation into Framptons, and not just into Mr Carey.”
  • In evidence, Chlanda admitted that he still believed that the police were investigating Framptons for fraud, even though he had been assured by the police that they were not and never had been.

So the plaintiff emerged victorious. The circulation of the paper was 11,500 and online viewers were estimated at 12,000 per month. The plaintiff’s damages were awarded at $100,000 plus interest, although the judge did not specifically identify any amount for aggravated damages. As for Mr Chlanda, well he might now be reconsidering the merits of his decision to represent himself.

 



Cairns belts match-fixing claim out of the ground: Cairns v Modi [2012] EWHC 756 (QB)

In 1983 I remember going to the MCG with my father and watching a swashbuckling New Zealand batsman, Lance Cairns, belt 6 sixes all around the biggest ground in the world, off some of the finest fast bowlers in the world. Dennis Lillee and Rodney Hogg could only sit back and watch as Cairns smashed them into the crowd a few times, including one famous shot with only hand on the bat. Not really relevant, but interesting if you are a hack park cricketer and frustrated cricket writer.

The plaintiff

Twenty-eight years later, that man’s son, Chris Lance Cairns, who happened to be another burly and swashbuckling batsman who could hit the ball long distances while chewing gum, got himself embroiled in a defamation case. So begins this story.

The defendant was Lolit Modi, a man born into a multi-million Rupee empire, former head of the Indian Premier League and one of the most powerful sporting administrators in the world. At the time in 2010, the Indian Premier League was assembling a list of the world’s best cricketers. The players put themselves up for auction, their services open to be accepted by one of the various Indian Twenty20 teams, whoever bid the most. Teams were paying figures in excess of $1 million for certain players, just to play 6 weeks of cricket. Current and retired cricketers from all around the world queued up to be involved. In January 2010, Modi sent out Tweets about Cairns saying this:

  •  “Chris Cairns removed from the IPL auction list due to his past record in match fixing. This was done by the Governing Council.”;
  • We have removed him from the list for alleged allegations [sic] as we have zero tolerance of this kind of stuff. The Governing Council has decided against keeping him on the list.”
  • “We know what we are doing and at the end of the day he is not going to be allowed to play and that’s it. Let him sue us, then we will produce what we have in court.”

Thems are fighting words. For those not versed with the knowledge of cricket, saying someone is a match fixer is about the worst thing you can say about a cricketer. On the ground, sly fast bowlers sledge their opposing batsmen with all sorts of nasty insults about their heritage, their bowel movements and their mother…. But when it comes to match fixing…. well that is just the worst. Seriously.

Chris Cairns denied all of it and sued. Quite simply, he put his career on the line in this case. Modi claimed truth as his defence and his barrister summed up their position in his closing at the end of the 7-day trial:

 “In our submission it was nothing short of a diabolical scheme that involved blackmailing young players of ability and integrity into match fixing when that was the last thing they wanted to do… So they were prisoners. They were being abused. There was a breach of trust by the captain and the vice-captain. They were like children in an orphans’ home who, abused by everyone around them, can trust no one, can report to no one.

 Justice Bean (not the Rowan Atkinson variety) heard the case and delivered judgment on 26 March. Firstly, the judgment showed His Honour had a good cricket brain, (he was probably a stodgy opening batsman). He quoted Cairns’ impressive Test playing career, which ended in 2004 and even acknowledged that the T20 game had changed the face of cricket.

The circumstances surrounded events in the Indian Cricket League, a pre-cursor to the Indian Premier League that started in 2007. The teams in the ICL comprised Indian players and overseas talent, and they also played 20 over cricket against each other. Cairns was the big fish in the league. He was hired to be captain of the Chandigarh Lions and was paid $350,000 per year.

The defendant tried to rustle up witnesses to support his truth defence. While

Modi did not give evidence himself, he called evidence from an anti-corruption

Modi outside court: (photo from inforrm.wordpress. See link to Media Law in UK).

officer that had been hired by the ICL, Mr Howard Beer, a former police officer from Melbourne and a number of players from the Chandigarh Lions.

A lot of the trial focused on a meeting in October 2008 at the Shangri-La Hotel. Seven people were at that meeting, including various ICL cricketing luminaries, but only Cairns and Beer gave evidence about it. At that meeting, Cairns’ contract with the ICL was terminated. Cairns said this was because he had injured himself in a charity walk in the months leading up to the third set of games, jeopardising his ability to play (he could not bowl) and he had failed to tell the organisers about it.

On the other hand, relying on the evidence of Howard Beer, the defence contended that in that meeting, Cairns had been sacked because he was suspected of match fixing and had conducted himself in a way that indicated that he was guilty.

It was accepted that Cairns got himself injured in the charity walk. That was to raise funds for a foundation he had established in memory of his sister, who had been killed in a road accident. It was accepted that Cairns could not bowl as a result. He played only as a batsman.

While differing versions of the meeting were proffered. Cairns did give evidence that rumours of match fixing had been raised by the ICL people to him in that meeting, and he said there was nothing to them. They were apparently relieved. He said the discussion then related to his injury. His services were terminated, but he was told he could apply for a new contract for the following season when he was fit. Some time later, he received a phone call from a senior ICL person who was at the meeting. He wished Cairns well with his flight to Dubai and all the best for his surgery. As His Honour noted, this interest was not consistent with a player who had been sacked because, as the defence put it, he was involved in a “diabolical scheme”.

In a contemporaneous phone call after that meeting, Cairns rang an English barrister, Andrew Fitch-Holland, who he was friends with and who helped him with legal advice from time to time. Cairns did not mention match-fixing to Fitch-Holland, who corroborated this in his evidence. This was crucial. At the very least, as His Honour pointed out, Cairns would have asked his barrister friend about the match-fixing allegation, if that was the reason for his sacking.

It turned out that Cairns had received payments of around 113,000 pounds from a man called Vijay Dimon in Dubai. The defence alleged that these payments were suspicious. The evidence was found in Cairns’ bank statements, which were discovered just a couple of weeks before the trial started. Cairns said that Dimon was a diamond trader and a friend, for whom he had provided marketing services. The defence contended that these monies were advances for match fixing that he was about to undertake. As the judge pointed out, this would have been very odd: surely match fixers would only pay after they had achieved their result!? Cairns’ explanation was accepted. This left the defence with a massive hole in their case – If Cairns was guilty of match-fixing, how come he did not make any money out of it?

Anyhow, the defence called a number of Chandigarh Lions players. Some gave evidence by videolink, some simply provided statements. In a nutshell, His Honour concluded that he could not rely on any of them.

In giving evidence, Howard Beer was convinced that Cairns was involved in match fixing and left others in no doubt that was the case. But under cross-examination, the following exchange took place:

 ”Q. On the basis of what material did you tell these two gentlemen that you had no doubt that Mr Cairns was involved in match fixing?

A. Probably on the strength of TP Singh’s statement.

Q. But you told me earlier that TP Singh was a man whose word was to be treated with extreme caution, Mr Beer.

A. Correct.

Q. Why didn’t you simply say `There is one allegation made against him by a witness over whom, it must be said, there are some doubts about his credibility’? That would have been a perfectly straight and fair answer, wouldn’t it?

A. It may well have been, but I didn’t say that.

 On the evidence of TP Singh, apparently Beer accepted that TP Singh was: “an out and out cheat and a man whose word could not be trusted.”

The Judge was not impressed with Beer’s evidence and inferred that he was not independent. This was another massive blow for the defendant.

The other allegations raised by players appeared vague, at their highest. While there were substantial allegations made against the Vice-captain of the team, they never really clearly implicated Cairns. Whenever evidence did appear to implicate Cairns, it arose from statements made shortly prior to the trial that were not consistent with statements made 3 weeks after the events took place (3 years prior), when there was often no mention of matters incriminating Cairns. Those statements were taken by Mr Beer in 2008. Other incriminating statements just appeared not to make any sense and ultimately, His Honour was very sceptical.

With regards to the evidence of TP Singh, the “out and out cheat”, His Honour simply stated : “I agree and have nothing to add.”

So Cairns wins. His Honour concluded that he essentially emerged unscathed after prolonged and occasionally intrusive cross-examination. He was a professional cricketer of good character and reputation. He won 90,000 pounds, including 15,000 for aggravated damages, not to mention costs, which would be astronomical. Quite clearly, the defendant’s fiery closing did not help.

But for now, Cairns can move on and perhaps get back to the family tradition of smashing cricket balls over the fence.

 

 

 

 

 



Music promoter wins $225,000: Trkulja v Yahoo! Inc LLC & Yahoo! 7 Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 88

Supreme Court of Victoria

Michael Trkulja was born in Yugoslavia in 1950. He migrated to Australia at 20 and in the early 1970s, while working in a travel agency business, began promoting singers and entertainers in the Yugoslav community. His work as a music promoter grew and he ultimately became a music promoter who worked full-time and was well-known. He regularly appeared in the media, particularly the ethnic media and in the 1990s had his own television show on Channel 31, “Micky’s Folkfest”. The purpose of the show was to unite the local Yugoslav community, and the evidence was that he became so well known that around 90% of the Yugloslav community (300,000 – 400,000 people), would have known him.

From January 2009 to December 2009, an article was published by the defendants through the “Yahoo! 7” search service on a website entitled “Melbourne Crime”. Beneath the heading were photographs of nine men, who the defendants admitted were, or were alleged to have been engaged in serious criminal activity in Melbourne. One of the nine photographs was Tony Mokbel, another Dennis Tanner. Underneath the photos were six links, and underneath those links, the heading of an article “Shooting Probe urged in November 20, 2007.”

To the right of the article was a large photo of Trkulja and then an article:

“Police Chief Christine Nixon has been urged to re-open an investigation into an unsolved murder attempt. Former music promoter Michael Trkulja was shot in the back by a hitman wearing a balaclava while dining at a St Albans restaurant in June 2004.

The would-be killer fled after his pistol jammed as he prepared to fire a second shot at Mr Trkulja, who had been enjoying a Sunday lunch with his elderly mother.

A Victoria Police document reveals detectives dropped the investigation because of a lack of evidence.

But Mr Trkulja, 58, now claims to know the identity of the hit man and those who hired him.

He says he has passed the names to the police.

`He (the hit man) was offered $10,000 to kill me. I know who sent him and they know that I know who they are’, Trkulja told the Herald Sun.

`I’ve told the police. I just want justice.’

`Nobody should be shot like this.’

Mr Trulja’s lawyer, high profile solicitor George Defteros, has written to Ms Nixon seeking a fresh investigation and the request is being considered.”

 The plaintiff sued and pleaded 3 imputations arose from the article:

  1. the plaintiff is a criminal;
  2. the plaintiff was so involved with crime in Melbourne that his rivals had hired a hit man to murder him;
  3. the plaintiff is such a significant figure in the Melbourne criminal underworld that events involving him are recorded on a website that chronicles crime in Melbourne.

The trial ran before a jury for 4 days in March. Yahoo! did not run a positive

The defendants

defence. It ultimately admitted publication, but submitted that the article did not convey the imputations and denied that the plaintiff had been defamed. This meant that the question of whether the indexation of the article on the Yahoo search engine constituted publication was not determined.

The jury concluded that the article carried imputations 2 and 3 and those were defamatory of the plaintiff. It was then up to His Honour Justice Kaye to assess the damages.

In assessing the damages, Justice Kaye referred to the following evidence:

  • when the plaintiff found out about the article, he was shocked, devastated and almost in tears;
  • the plaintiff asked Yahoo! to take the article down. It denied publication and refused;
  • the plaintiff gave evidence that around 500 people had spoken to him about the article;
  • at a wedding in January 2011, two couples who had been designated to sit at his table refused to do so, asserting that they would not sit with a criminal;
  • before the article, he would be invited to 25-30 weddings a year, that number declined and in 2011, he received no invitations;
  • on a number of occasions, he went into a shop, people recognised him and immediately left;
  • other witnesses had received comments about the plaintiff to the effect that he was a criminal; and
  • the plaintiff had also sued Google in respect of the same article;

His Honour concluded that:

  1. before the publication of the article, the plaintiff had a widespread reputation as a person of good repute in the Yugoslav community;
  2. it was unarguable that the imputations that were conveyed were particularly grave;
  3. the article reached a widespread audience and thus the damage to the plaintiff’s reputation was similarly widespread;
  4. the fact that the material remained available through the Yahoo! search engine, without being removed, served to increase the damage to the plaintiff’s reputation throughout the community;
  5. the article caused significant grief and distress to the plaintiff.

While aggravated damages were refused, His Honour still concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to damages of $225,000 plus interest of 3%, so well done to the plaintiff. Having said that, he will probably be waiting for the appeal period to expire before he pops open the champagne. And after that, the plaintiff still has his case against Google, although recent developments in the UK in Google’s favour could well have something to say about that one.



Electric car case against Top Gear written off: Tesla Motors Ltd v BBC [2012] EWHC 310 (QB)

On 14 December 2008, Top Gear broadcast a show that featured an electric car made by the Claimants, a Roadster. Its body was similar to a Lotus Elise, a petrol powered car and the Top Gear episode showed a race between the two.

The race started well for the Roadster, but given that this was the third interlocutory judgment given by Justice Tugendhat, the Claimants had been previously struck out and were still trying to amend, one can presume that the Roadster did not win.

At the start though, the Roadster got off to a flyer and Jeremy Clarkson was excited. He said this:

 “Wave goodbye to dial up and say hello to the world of broadband motoring. 12 and a half rpm I cannot believe this. That is biblically quick. This car is electric … literally. The top speed may be only 125 mph but there is so much talk it does 0 to 60 in 3.9 seconds. Not bad for a motor that is the size of a water melon and only has one moving part.”

 But soon after, things went a little awry:

 “This car really was shaping up to be something wonderful but then (artificial dying motor sounds and music slowing down and stopping) … although Tesla say it will do 200 miles we have worked out that on our track it will run out after just 55 miles and if it does run out it is not a quick job to charge it up again. (Footage of people pushing the Roadster into the hangar followed by Jeremy Clarkson inserting the charger into the Roadster)….

 Tesla issued proceedings in defamation and malicious falsehood. The claim

The Roadster

was issued on 29 March 2011, so it was only limited to publications within the 12-month period before then. This included internet broadcasts and other re-publications, but the slow start was critical. From there, the Roadster was always struggling to catch up.

The case had massive problems. The Claimants were seeking to amend their claim to include a further defamation claim (having been previously struck out) and provide particulars of special damage for their malicious falsehood claim, which ran for 10 pages.

In his first interlocutory judgment, Justice Tugendhat held that the broadcast was not capable of conveying the defamatory imputations pleaded by the Claimants. So the defamation case was struck out. Tesla sought to reinstate the claim by amending the imputations and also sought to beef up its malicious falsehood claim.

Tesla claimed that the broadcast carried the following falsehoods:

  1. the first Roadster shown (which was silver in colour) did not run out of charge – BBC AGREED;
  2. the first Roadster did not have to be pushed back into the hangar as a result of running out of charge – BBC AGREED;
  3. At no point were the brakes of the first Roadster broken;
  4. the second Roadster (which was grey in colour) did not become immobile as a result of over heating.
  5. There was no time at which neither Roadster was available for driving.

But Tesla faced substantial obstacles in this race:

  • Tesla admitted that it was true that the Roadster would run out after 55 miles on Top Gear’s racing track, so even if that was a factor in turning people away from the car, it would not sound in damages;
  • In claiming damages, Tesla could not properly distinguish between damages caused by this true representation and other representations that it asserted were untrue;
  • the majority of viewers saw the broadcast before 30 March 2010 and Tesla could not sue in respect of any damage caused by the initial broadcasts. After that, it was impossible to tell what damage was caused by the time-barred publications and what were not;

His Honour held that these difficulties were caused by Tesla and its failure to bring the case earlier. To use the formal legal expression that was concisely referred to by His Honour, BBC were being “mucked about”.  The amendment sought by Tesla was vague and “gravely deficient”. Permission to amend was refused. There was no real prospect of showing that the alleged falsehoods caused damage.

Further, in terms of the damage sought, Tesla claimed loss of profits of $3.8 million US or $171,000 for expenses thrown away on parts bought for cars that were never made. Not entirely consistent with the public statement by Roadster on 30 March 2011 that:

 “Its not that we’re hurting. We’ve sold more than 1500 Roadsters and our cars have done more than 10 million miles. The broader issue here is the impact on electric vehicles…. we’d like them [BBC] to admit that they lied, and they keep pushing these lies. We just want them to set the record straight”.

 So on that statement alone, the $3.8 million claim was not looking so good. The case of malicious falsehood was bound to fail and it was not allowed to proceed.

In terms of defamation, after having previous imputations struck out, the Claimants sought to amend, to claim that the following imputation arose:

 “there were reasonable grounds to suspect that each of the Claimants had intentionally and significantly misrepresented the range of the Roadster by claiming that it had a range of about 200 miles in that its true range on the Top Gear Track was only 55 miles.”

 His Honour held that the broadcast was incapable of bearing that meaning. At [106]:

As any reasonable motorist knows, a manufacturer’s statement about the range of a motor vehicle is always qualified by a statement as to the driving conditions under which that range may be expected…. But such statements are rarely if ever given to the public by reference to racing on a test track.

 So the application to amend was dismissed. No malicious falsehood claim would proceed and no defamation claim would proceed. At least the electric car did not waste energy on a trial.

 

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2012/310.html

 

 

 



Google not liable for blogger.com: Tamiz v Google Inc and Google UK Limited [2012] EWHC 449 (QB)

In blogger.com, Google provides a platform on the internet for bloggers all around the world, basically, to write what they want for free.  These blogs now contain more than a trillion words and 250,000 new words are added every minute. That is 40,000 words per second. It makes War and Peace look like a limerick.

And given that 99.9% (estimate without any mathematical basis whatsoever) of the world’s most scandalous bloggers are anonymous, Google was always going to find itself having to answer this question: is it liable for the defamatory publications of these bloggers?

In this case, Justice Eady of the UK High Court answered the question with an emphatic no.

What happened was this. On 28 and 30 April 2011, an article and 8 defamatory comments were posted about Mr Payam Tamiz, a former Conservative Party candidate in Thanet, on a blog entitled “ London Muslim”. The article was headed “Tory Muslim Candidate Payam Tamiz resigns after calling girls sluts”. Then under a photo of Tamiz, the words on the London Muslim website were these:

Payam Tamiz a Tory Muslim Council candidate with a 5 o’clock shadow has

The Claimant

resigned from the party after calling Thanet girls ‘sluts’.

Tamiz who on his Twitter page describes himself as an ‘ambitious British Muslim’ is bizarrely studying law so one would have thought this Tory prat with Star Trek Spock ears might have engaged the odd brain cell before making these offensive remarks.

Eight commenters posted further defamatory material after the article. Variously calling Mr Tamiz a drug dealer, a violent racist, from a family of criminals and not a nice person. Pretty nasty stuff. And all anonymous.

Soon after, Tamiz emailed Google Inc, under the “Report abuse” function. The Blogger Team ultimately stated that it would not pull the article down and asked Tamiz if it could inform the blogger of his complaint. Which it then did.

By the time this happened, it was August 2011, and within 3 days of being notified of the complaint by Google Inc, the blogger took the material down. Meanwhile, at around the same time, Tamiz issued proceedings against Google UK and Google Inc in America. He didn’t sue the blogger or the individual commenters. Obviously, he didn’t know who they were.

Given that Google UK only did marketing and support and had nothing to do with blogger.com, it was not a liable entity. The question remained of the possible liability of Google Inc in America. In September 2011, and in Google Inc’s absence, Tamiz was given permission to serve it with the proceedings outside the jurisdiction.

Google Inc subsequently sought an order setting aside the service of proceedings. Among other matters, it alleged that it was not a publisher of the blog (even after it got notice of Tamiz’s complaint) and therefore could not possibly be held liable. In which case, service of proceedings on it would be futile.

Google submitted this:

  • In blogger.com, it regarded itself as providing a platform for the free exchange of information and ideas and would not wish to be seen as a censor.  It would be virtually impossible for Google to exercise any editorial control over the content of the material published on blogger.com;
  • It has no control over any of its content and is therefore not a publisher but merely a neutral service provider;
  • It has no way of knowing whether the comments complained of were true or not and it cannot reasonably be expected to investigate and determine the truth or falsity of allegations made by bloggers;
  • It was as if it owned a wall on which various people had chosen to inscribe graffiti and it did not regard itself as being more responsible for the content of these graffiti than would the owner of such a wall;
  • It would be unrealistic to attribute responsibility to it for publication of material on any particular blog, whether before or after notification of a complaint; and
  • In any event, it was protected by s.1 of the Defamation Act 1996 (UK) and/or Regulation 19 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002.

Putting to one side the English legislation, (which in any event, assisted Google Inc to deny responsibility), Justice Eady concluded that it was significant that Google Inc was not required to take any positive steps, technically, in the process of continuing the accessibility of the offending material, whether it had been notified of the complainant’s objection or not.

At [39], Eady J accepted Google Inc’s submissions and concluded that it should not be regarded as a publisher or even as one who authorises publication under the established principles of the common law.  Its role, as a platform provider is a purely passive one.

So Tamiz’s case was struck out. No doubt that Google (and possibly Facebook and Twitter) will be rejoicing. But in the meantime, Tamiz is going to have to set about finding the anonymous blogger in cyberspace. Perhaps he can take a leaf from Liu’s book here in Australia? Sue John Doe.



Copying the defendant’s imputations – Just not on: Waterhouse v The Age Company Ltd & Ors [2012] NSWSC 9

After the customary fight about imputations, the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim alleged that articles from The Age carried the following imputations about him:

(a)     the plaintiff procured the murder of George Brown; OR

(b)     the plaintiff was an accessory to the murder of George Brown.”

Robbie Waterhouse

The Age’s defence then pleaded contextual truth and that the articles had the following imputations:

(A)    the plaintiff feared arrest for the murder of George Brown, because he used Brown to fix horses and placed money in a suspicious betting plunge on a horse Brown trained, two days before he was murdered;

(B)    the plaintiff attempted to cheat bookmakers and the general public out of large amounts of money in the Fine Cotton ring-in;

(C)    the plaintiff was an accessory to a criminal conspiracy to cheat and defraud;

(D)    the plaintiff was sent to gaol for lying to the Racing Appeals Tribunal about his prior knowledge of a criminal substitution racket.

(E)    the plaintiff acted so dishonestly as a bookmaker that he was warned off race-tracks worldwide;

(F)    the plaintiff acted criminally as a bookmaker;

(G)    the plaintiff is a repeatedly dishonest bookmaker.

The plaintiff then tried to amend his statement of claim again, and include The Age’s imputations as his own. That way, The Age would not be allowed to run the contextual imputations defence because its imputations were no longer “in addition to” the plaintiff’s, as required by section 26 of the Defamation Act. A brilliant plan. The Age opposed  the plaintiff’s to amend.

Justice Nicholas referred to the conclusions of the Court of Appeal in Besser v Kermode that the defence of contextual truth had to defeat the whole defamatory matter. This must mean that the defendant’s imputations would necessarily have to have a worse effect on the plaintiff’s reputation, then the imputations that the plaintiff alleges. In this case, it is arguable that the defendant’s imputations are no worse than the plaintiff’s imputation that he “procured the murder of George Brown”. Nevertheless, the defence seemed to be addressed only to the second imputation and the question in this instance was about the plaintiff’s further amended statement of claim.

Nicholas J concluded that the amendments were not necessary and that if they were allowed, The Age would be deprived of a defence. This would be a grave injustice to it [29]. His Honour emphasized the need for a plaintiff to get the imputations right at the start (which virtually never happens). Anyhow, the defendant can run its contextual truth defence and the case will move on.